The Impact of the Interaction between Executive Compensation Stickiness and the Large Stockholder Control on the Performance-Based on Sample Data of 210 Natural Person Holding Companies

DOI

10.2991/seiem-17.2018.121How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Large stockholder, Equity control, Executive, Compensation stickiness, Corporate performance

Abstract

The phenomenon of "Executive Compensation Stickiness" has been studied for scholars in recent years. This study is based on sample data of 210 natural person holding companies. It uses SPSS20.0 statistical software for data statistics and analysis to explore the impact of interaction between executive compensation stickiness and the large stockholder control on the performance. The research finds that executive compensation stickiness is widespread, and there is no correlation with large shareholder control. But the interaction between them has positive effect on corporate performance. It shows that executive compensation stickiness and large shareholder control exist rationally. For the long-term development of the enterprises, it is necessary to effectively control the stickiness of executive compensation and establish a scientific salary mechanism.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Lina Qin
AU  - Shangshu Liu
PY  - 2017/12
DA  - 2017/12
TI  - The Impact of the Interaction between Executive Compensation Stickiness and the Large Stockholder Control on the Performance-Based on Sample Data of 210 Natural Person Holding Companies
BT  - Proceedings of the 2017 2nd International Seminar on Education Innovation and Economic Management (SEIEM 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 484
EP  - 487
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/seiem-17.2018.121
DO  - 10.2991/seiem-17.2018.121
ID  - Qin2017/12
ER  -