Analysis on the Auction Mechanism of State-owned Land Considering Security Housing Factors

DOI

10.2991/seiem-18.2019.14How to use a DOI?

Keywords

land auction; competitive security housing area; mechanism design; truth-telling

Abstract

After 2008, there are some new forms of state-owned land auction in China, such as Limited Housing Price Auction (LHPA), Limited Land Price Auction (LLPA) and Limited Land Price Auction with Security House (LLPA-SH). This paper discusses the implementation of the Limited Land Price Auction with Security House (LLPA-SH) on the basis of Bayesian equilibrium, and gives the conditions for the implementation of the truth-telling mechanism through the introduction of the security housing factor. The results show that both LLPA and LLPA-SH can accomplish the goal of the optimal allocation and utilization of resources. When private information exists, social welfare is primarily a trade-off between consumers and real estate developers, while under the truth-telling mechanism; the distribution of benefits is mainly between consumers and the government.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xuefeng Zhang
AU  - Shuping Wang
PY  - 2019/01
DA  - 2019/01
TI  - Analysis on the Auction Mechanism of State-owned Land Considering Security Housing Factors
BT  - Proceedings of the 3rd International Seminar on Education Innovation and Economic Management (SEIEM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 52
EP  - 55
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/seiem-18.2019.14
DO  - 10.2991/seiem-18.2019.14
ID  - Zhang2019/01
ER  -