Study on the Standard Mechanism for the Use of Funds by Credit Village Borrowers

DOI

10.2991/wrarm-17.2017.29How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Credit village; Moral hazard; Dynamic game; Earnings

Abstract

In order to test the credit village mode can effectively regulate the behavior of the borrower's moral hazard, in this paper, by establishing a dynamic game model, the traditional mode of borrower credit loans and credit village funds use behavior selection are analyzed. The results show that the credit village under the "supervision, report the behavior, to punish behavior" existence and behavior using the borrower credit village has significant positive correlation between confirmed the credit village unique mode of operation characteristics can effectively prevent moral hazard of the borrower.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Haoming Liu
AU  - Neng Jiang
PY  - 2017/11
DA  - 2017/11
TI  - Study on the Standard Mechanism for the Use of Funds by Credit Village Borrowers
BT  - Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium of Risk Analysis and Risk Management in Western China (WRARM 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 164
EP  - 169
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/wrarm-17.2017.29
DO  - 10.2991/wrarm-17.2017.29
ID  - Liu2017/11
ER  -