Volume 12, Issue 2, 2019, Pages 1255 - 1260
A Bargaining Solution With Level Structure
Authors
Xiao Yan1, Li Dengfeng2, *
1School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, 350108, China
2School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 611731, China
*Corresponding author. Email: lidengfeng@uestc.edu.cn
Corresponding Author
Li Dengfeng
Received 30 August 2019, Accepted 22 September 2019, Available Online 22 October 2019.
- DOI
- 10.2991/ijcis.d.191016.002How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Game theory; Level structure; Bargaining solution; Bankruptcy problem
- Abstract
Presently, a conventional coalition structure can no more cover all the types of cooperative structures in practice, external cooperation between the coalitions also affects the payoff allocation between the participants. We propose a solution to solve the bargaining problem with level structure by defining for each coalition and each level. The solution concentrates on the bargaining of the coalitions with each other at each level. Furthermore, we discuss the applications of this solution to bankruptcy games with level structure. The proposed solution generalizes the bargaining solution with conventional coalition structure, which can be utilized in more cooperative types with level structures.
- Copyright
- © 2019 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
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TY - JOUR AU - Xiao Yan AU - Li Dengfeng PY - 2019 DA - 2019/10/22 TI - A Bargaining Solution With Level Structure JO - International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems SP - 1255 EP - 1260 VL - 12 IS - 2 SN - 1875-6883 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/ijcis.d.191016.002 DO - 10.2991/ijcis.d.191016.002 ID - Yan2019 ER -