Using Trust Game for Cross-Strait Security Risk Analysis

DOI

10.2991/jrarc.2018.8.2.3How to use a DOI?

Keywords

trust game, Nash equilibrium, bilateral trust, security risk

Abstract

The interactions of the Mainland China offering benefits, the Taiwan benefits return, and the benefits of China-Taiwan bilateral trust between the China and Taiwan are modeled as a trust game. The trust strategy is best response for China and Taiwan if the benefit of China-Taiwan bilateral trust is increased based on Nash equilibrium analysis. This study simulated a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Experimental results show that the China’s expected payoffs of N.E. fix and Taiwan’s expected payoffs of N.E. are increased if the payoffs of China-Taiwan bi-lateral trust are increased. The Chinese mainland released new measures on exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. Taiwan accepts these measures results in favor of Taiwan’s expected payoffs and decreases the level of risk.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cheng-Kuang Wu
AU  - Chongfu Huang
PY  - 2018
DA  - 2018/06/30
TI  - Using Trust Game for Cross-Strait Security Risk Analysis
JO  - Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response
SP  - 75
EP  - 84
VL  - 8
IS  - 2
SN  - 2210-8505
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/jrarc.2018.8.2.3
DO  - 10.2991/jrarc.2018.8.2.3
ID  - Wu2018
ER  -