Proceedings of the International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society

Analysis on Supply Chain Finance Accounts Receivable Financing Mode Game

Authors
Zhigao Liao, Xiaojing Zhao, Ze Feng
Corresponding Author
Zhigao Liao
Available Online January 2015.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Supply chain finance; Accounts receivable financing; Game; Nash equilibrium
Abstract

Supply Chain Finance (SCF) evaluate the enterprise financing credit risk from the perspective of supply chain, and then solve the financing problem of small and medium enterprises. In this paper, through the establishment of game model, games of perfect information and two parties for accounts receivable financing mode were analyzed, and enable it to achieve the Nash equilibrium. Through the analysis: strengthening the punishment on all kinds of breach can help to reduce the credit risk and enhance the financing of enterprise credit.

Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society
Series
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
Publication Date
January 2015
ISBN
10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21
ISSN
2352-5398
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
Open Access
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhigao Liao
AU  - Xiaojing Zhao
AU  - Ze Feng
PY  - 2015/01
DA  - 2015/01
TI  - Analysis on Supply Chain Finance Accounts Receivable Financing Mode Game
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 95
EP  - 99
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21
ID  - Liao2015/01
ER  -