Analysis on Supply Chain Finance Accounts Receivable Financing Mode Game

DOI

10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Supply chain finance; Accounts receivable financing; Game; Nash equilibrium

Abstract

Supply Chain Finance (SCF) evaluate the enterprise financing credit risk from the perspective of supply chain, and then solve the financing problem of small and medium enterprises. In this paper, through the establishment of game model, games of perfect information and two parties for accounts receivable financing mode were analyzed, and enable it to achieve the Nash equilibrium. Through the analysis: strengthening the punishment on all kinds of breach can help to reduce the credit risk and enhance the financing of enterprise credit.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhigao Liao
AU  - Xiaojing Zhao
AU  - Ze Feng
PY  - 2015/01
DA  - 2015/01
TI  - Analysis on Supply Chain Finance Accounts Receivable Financing Mode Game
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Education, Management, Commerce and Society
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 95
EP  - 99
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21
DO  - 10.2991/emcs-15.2015.21
ID  - Liao2015/01
ER  -