The ultimate holding company, corporate governance mechanism, and information transparency of listed companies
- DOI
- 10.2991/icemeet-16.2017.124How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- the ultimate controlling shareholders; Controlling shareholders encroach on; Information transparency; Corporate governance mechanism
- Abstract
this article from the perspective of ultimate controlling shareholder characteristics and corporate governance mechanism, the building two-period dynamic behavior financial theory model and empirical study on the method of combining with time window of shenzhen in 2009-2013 data of listed companies as samples, to study the relations of ultimate controlling shareholder and corporate information transparency. Study found that: based on the control of the pursuit of self-interest, the ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies in information manipulation, and as the controlling shareholder control with the increase of the degree of separation of cash flow right, this kind of information manipulation get intensified; On the contrary, raising the level of cash flow right, the improvement of company internal and external governance mechanism, is to some extent inhibited the excessive information manipulation, which increases the transparency of information.
- Copyright
- © 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Zhi-wen Gong AU - An Xu PY - 2017/01 DA - 2017/01 TI - The ultimate holding company, corporate governance mechanism, and information transparency of listed companies BT - Proceedings of the 2016 2nd International Conference on Economics, Management Engineering and Education Technology (ICEMEET 2016) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 585 EP - 590 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/icemeet-16.2017.124 DO - 10.2991/icemeet-16.2017.124 ID - Gong2017/01 ER -