Research on the Value of Independent Directors of Universities: Evidence from the Resignation of Independent Directors of Universities3
- https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200428.088How to use a DOI?
- the value of independent directors of universities, resignation, market reaction
In this paper, using Notice No.11 of Education Department in 2015 as an exogenous event, we test the value of independent directors of universities when they resign from the listed companies. First, we find that the market reaction is negative and significant. Moreover, the reaction has the characteristics of state-dependence. It means that the market reaction of state-owned listed companies is significantly negative, while the non-state-owned listed companies is significantly positive. Second, the governance mechanism of independent directors of universities as special committee members is limited in state-owned listed companies. Third, in the short term, independent directors of universities with good reputation have played a significant role in non-state-owned listed companies, but the market is not optimistic about this resource support function in the long term. In a word, the main way for independent directors of universities to exert their value is to supervise and consult in the listed companies. Therefore, the governance mechanism of special committees should be further improved to improve the efficiency of independent director system.
- © 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Fei Che AU - Yan Jiang PY - 2020 DA - 2020/05/01 TI - Research on the Value of Independent Directors of Universities: Evidence from the Resignation of Independent Directors of Universities3 BT - Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Humanities and Social Science Research (ICHSSR 2020) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 403 EP - 414 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200428.088 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200428.088 ID - Che2020 ER -