The Issue of Control in State-Owned Enterprises in Russia and China: The Board, Affiliation, and Independent Directors: Comparative Legal Analysis
- 10.2991/assehr.k.200321.114How to use a DOI?
- comparative corporate law, China, Russia, board, independent directors, State-owned enterprises (SOE), political compliance
The author researches the institute of corporate control in Russia and China, the two countries excluded from the process of evolution of corporate law in the bigger part of XX century. The reception of Western corporate norms is, as it seems from comparative analysis, not an easy-going process in neither of the jurisdictions. State-owned enterprises, which play significant role both in China and Russia have their separate challenges, i.g. an ‘absent owner’ problem and the lack of minority shareholders’ rights protection. Such institutes as independent directors, disinterested directors, cumulative voting on elections of the Board members are compared and analysed.
- © 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - A. Molotnikov PY - 2020 DA - 2020/03/24 TI - The Issue of Control in State-Owned Enterprises in Russia and China: The Board, Affiliation, and Independent Directors: Comparative Legal Analysis BT - Proceedings of the XVII International Research-to-Practice Conference dedicated to the memory of M.I. Kovalyov (ICK 2020) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 205 EP - 211 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200321.114 DO - 10.2991/assehr.k.200321.114 ID - Molotnikov2020 ER -