Game Model on the Governmental Decision in River Basin Ecological Protection

DOI

10.2991/icssr-13.2013.165How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Game model; Nash equilibrium; Principal-agent; Decision-making;River basin ecology

Abstract

It is a principal-agent relationship in the process of the implementation of river basin ecological protection, which causes the game between the different governments inevitably. Game theory can explain the decision makers’ behavior under specific conditions. From analyzing the game model, it finds the Nash equilibrium under the different conditions between the central government and the local government. It is discussed how non-cooperative game might not be optimal for the whole system and how decision makers can make decisions based on self interests. Providing complete information and increasing the punishment probability, improving the incentive mechanism and reforming the local government’s performances evaluation in the future might help change behavior and decisions to make the stakeholders cooperative.

Copyright

© 2013, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xian-shi Li
AU  - Jian LI
PY  - 2013/07
DA  - 2013/07
TI  - Game Model on the Governmental Decision in River Basin Ecological Protection
BT  - Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Science and Social Research (ICSSR 2013)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 710
EP  - 714
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.165
DO  - 10.2991/icssr-13.2013.165
ID  - Li2013/07
ER  -