Study on the Relationship of Ownership Structure and Over-Investment of China’s Listed Companies
Available Online January 2019.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/ieesasm-18.2019.29How to use a DOI?
- Over-Investment, Ownership Concentration, Ultimate Controller, Equity Restriction
- Investment in the company’s financial activities has been one of the most important subjects. With the complexity and multiplicity of factors which influence investment decision-making, investment decision-making behavior not always serve the goal of listed companies, which results in the inefficient investment especially over-investment. This paper selects the companies which listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as research sample from 2013 to 2017 year, by using the Richardson’s (2006) residual model to measure the over-investment. Then three groups of multi regression analytical models have been built in three aspects which consist of the ownership concentration, the ultimate controller and the equity restriction to analyze the relationship between ownership structure and over-investment behavior. With empirical research, this paper has the following conclusions. The first majority shareholder’s holding is significantly “U-shape” correlated with over-investment. Equity restriction has negative correlation with over-investment. Over-investment of state-holding listed company is more than the over-investment of non-state-holding, but is not significant.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Chunhong Qian PY - 2019/01 DA - 2019/01 TI - Study on the Relationship of Ownership Structure and Over-Investment of China’s Listed Companies BT - Proceedings of the 2018 6th International Education, Economics, Social Science, Arts, Sports and Management Engineering Conference (IEESASM 2018) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 153 EP - 158 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/ieesasm-18.2019.29 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/ieesasm-18.2019.29 ID - Qian2019/01 ER -