The Impact Mechanism of Executive Incentive on Corporate Environmental Performance
- https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210728.002How to use a DOI?
- Executive incentive, Equity incentive, Environmental performance, Green governance
In China’s green governance project, enterprises occupy a dominant position. In recent years, in the field of corporate governance, executive incentive have become a common concern for academics and business owners. Therefore, how to formulate a reasonable and sound incentive mechanism to encourage executives to make more efforts in environmental governance, thereby improving environmental performance, has become the theme of this article. Instead of using external factors as the research theme in the previous studies, we take internal governance of enterprises as our main perspective, and use the literature research method to draw conclusions: excessive executive compensation incentive can inhibit corporate environmental performance; Appropriate equity incentive can promote the improvement of environmental performance; Compared with a single incentive method, the combination of two is more conducive. Therefore, in order to improve environmental performance, we suggest that enterprises should reasonably set the level of executive compensation, make good use of equity incentive, and effectively use a combination of incentive.
- © 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Rong Wang AU - Liangcan Liu PY - 2021 DA - 2021/07/29 TI - The Impact Mechanism of Executive Incentive on Corporate Environmental Performance BT - Proceedings of the 2021 2nd International Conference on Modern Education Management, Innovation and Entrepreneurship and Social Science (MEMIESS 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 7 EP - 11 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210728.002 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210728.002 ID - Wang2021 ER -