Analysis on the Conduct of Managing Agent of State-owned Enterprises Based on Dual Reputation
- 10.2991/msmi-15.2015.20How to use a DOI?
- State-owned enterprise, Agency by agreement, Dual reputation, The behavior of management.
The state-owned enterprise managers have a great feature, the operator is appointed by the superior government, the operators’ attention the relationship with administrative organization, the managers of state-owned enterprise have a strong consideration of reputation. The operator’s retention and promotion depends on the operator’s market reputation and political reputation. In the dual reputation, the operator behavior is divided into the normal behavior and the behavior of rent-seeking efforts, the operators maximize their expected utility through choosing their conduct. We analysis which factors influence the managers’ behavior, and study how to stimulate normal effort, reduce the rent-seeking behavior.
- © 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Feng Kong AU - Lin-Fang He PY - 2015/08 DA - 2015/08 TI - Analysis on the Conduct of Managing Agent of State-owned Enterprises Based on Dual Reputation BT - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Management Science and Management Innovation PB - Atlantis Press SP - 107 EP - 111 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-15.2015.20 DO - 10.2991/msmi-15.2015.20 ID - Kong2015/08 ER -