The Incentive Mechanism of Government to Bank in Loan Risk Compensation Mechanism for Technological SMEs
Mu Zhang, Zhi-yuan Lü
Available Online 12 April 2021.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210409.023How to use a DOI?
- technological SMEs, loan risk compensation mechanism, government, bank, multi-task principal-agent model, optimal incentive contract
- Establishing and perfecting the incentive mechanism of government to bank in loan risk compensation mechanism for technological SMEs is of great significance to improving the use efficiency of loan risk compensation funds for technological SMEs. Based on loans origination operation and bad debts write-off management operation, a multi-task principal-agent model for bank in loan risk compensation mechanism for technological SMEs was constructed, so that the optimal incentive conditions of bank were solved in two aspects: the incentive cost functions are inter-independent or inter-dependent. The results show, both the rational government and bank are induced by reality to complete the loans origination operation using more energy and time, but the bad debts write-off management operation is ignored to some extent. Therefore, the government should establish the quality evaluation system of bad debts write-off management for bank, as a result, the effort degree of bank in process of completing the bad debts write-off management operation can be directly observed. On the basis, paying equal attention to the performance of loans origination operation and bad debts write-off management operation, the incentive mechanism of government to bank will be constructed.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Mu Zhang AU - Zhi-yuan Lü PY - 2021 DA - 2021/04/12 TI - The Incentive Mechanism of Government to Bank in Loan Risk Compensation Mechanism for Technological SMEs BT - Proceedings of the 9th Annual Meeting of Risk Analysis Council of China Association for Disaster Prevention (RAC 2020) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 145 EP - 150 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210409.023 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210409.023 ID - Zhang2021 ER -