Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model for High Quality Development Between Governments and Logistics Enterprises

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.210121.097How to use a DOI?

Keywords

High quality development, Replication equation, Dynamic game

Abstract

Based on the assumption of the limited rationality of the government and logistics enterprises, the evolutionary game replication dynamic model of the governments and logistics enterprises on the high-quality development is established. The game method analyzes the behavior of the government, which is about the government’s support for the high-quality development of logistics enterprises. This paper explores the dynamic evolution process of game behavior, and discusses in detail the evolution of each parameter and how the parameters are set to form a stable strategy. The results show that the government and logistics enterprises pay more attention to high-quality development behaviors, the logistics enterprises are more willing to implement high-quality development. Governments and logistics enterprises can achieve a win-win situation in this state.

Copyright

© 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yingdong Ji
AU  - yanqing Gao
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/01/23
TI  - Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model for High Quality Development Between Governments and Logistics Enterprises
BT  - Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Conference on Social Science and Contemporary Humanity Development (SSCHD 2020)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 466
EP  - 470
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210121.097
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.210121.097
ID  - Ji2021
ER  -