Subsidization Versus Cooperation as Incentive for Emission Reduction R&D in a Supply Chain

DOI

https://doi.org/10.2991/icmess-18.2018.82How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Game theory; Carbon emissions; R&D; Technology policy

Abstract

This paper studies the emission reduction R&D in a two-level supply chain under two technology policies: R&D subsidization and R&D cooperation, and compares the performance of the two technology policies. By means of game theory, we derive the equilibrium decisions and then compare optimal decisions, profits and social welfare under the two policies with exogenous tax. Our results indicate that production quantity andemissions under R&D subsidization policy are lower than those under R&D cooperation policy, while the effort of the R&D subsidization policyis higher thanthat of the R&D cooperation policy. In addition, we identify the conditions when the R&D subsidization policy performs better thanthe R&D cooperation policy, and find that the comparison results thatsupply chain profits and social welfare depend on the level of emissions tax, the efficiency of R&D technology and the steepness of marginal environmental damage function. In most cases, R&D cooperation policy leads to higher social welfare compared with R&D subsidization policy.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Qinqin Li
PY  - 2018/06
DA  - 2018/06
TI  - Subsidization Versus Cooperation as Incentive for Emission Reduction R&D in a Supply Chain
BT  - 2018 2nd International Conference on Management, Education and Social Science (ICMESS 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 368
EP  - 373
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icmess-18.2018.82
DO  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icmess-18.2018.82
ID  - Li2018/06
ER  -