Study on the Dynamic Strategies of Differential Game of Water Pollution Control from the View of Public Participation

DOI

10.2991/mdhss-13.2013.114How to use a DOI?

Keywords

public participation, water pollution control, differential game, feedback Nash equilibrium

Abstract

Water pollution control is a systematic engineering which needs the whole society to participate in, especially the public participation. This paper develops a continuous-time differential game of water pollution control between government and the public with the consideration of dynamic change of pollutants in the rivers. The public determines participation efforts and the government determines its enforcement level. And we obtain a set of feedback Nash equilibrium for the problem. Through analysis on the properties of the equilibrium solutions, some results are derived: The efforts of public participation is positively related to the enforcement level of government; When the government gives a reasonable bonus to the citizens who do well in reporting pollution behaviors of entrepreneurs, increasing bonus will induce an increase of the efforts of public participation. Finally, we make some suggestions to improve the public participation efforts in the water pollution control.

Copyright

© 2013, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhenyun Hu
AU  - Chen Chen
PY  - 2013/12
DA  - 2013/12
TI  - Study on the Dynamic Strategies of Differential Game of Water Pollution Control from the View of Public Participation
BT  - Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on the Modern Development of Humanities and Social Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 434
EP  - 437
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/mdhss-13.2013.114
DO  - 10.2991/mdhss-13.2013.114
ID  - Hu2013/12
ER  -