Study on the Dynamic Strategies of Differential Game of Water Pollution Control from the View of Public Participation
Zhenyun Hu, Chen Chen
Available Online December 2013.
- https://doi.org/10.2991/mdhss-13.2013.114How to use a DOI?
- public participation, water pollution control, differential game, feedback Nash equilibrium
- Water pollution control is a systematic engineering which needs the whole society to participate in, especially the public participation. This paper develops a continuous-time differential game of water pollution control between government and the public with the consideration of dynamic change of pollutants in the rivers. The public determines participation efforts and the government determines its enforcement level. And we obtain a set of feedback Nash equilibrium for the problem. Through analysis on the properties of the equilibrium solutions, some results are derived: The efforts of public participation is positively related to the enforcement level of government; When the government gives a reasonable bonus to the citizens who do well in reporting pollution behaviors of entrepreneurs, increasing bonus will induce an increase of the efforts of public participation. Finally, we make some suggestions to improve the public participation efforts in the water pollution control.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Zhenyun Hu AU - Chen Chen PY - 2013/12 DA - 2013/12 TI - Study on the Dynamic Strategies of Differential Game of Water Pollution Control from the View of Public Participation BT - 2013 International Conference on the Modern Development of Humanities and Social Science PB - Atlantis Press SP - 434 EP - 437 SN - 1951-6851 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/mdhss-13.2013.114 DO - https://doi.org/10.2991/mdhss-13.2013.114 ID - Hu2013/12 ER -